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ABSTRACT
In this article, we consider whether “panel effects”—that is, the condition
where the presence, or expected voting behavior, of one judge on a judicial
panel influences the way another judge, or set of judges, on the same panel
votes—varies depending upon the form of the legal doctrine. In particular,
we ask whether the hand of an ideological minority appellate judge (that is,
a Democrat-appointed judge with two Republican appointees or a Republi-
can-appointed judge with two Democrat appointees) is strengthened by the
existence of a legal doctrine packaged in the form of a rule rather than a
standard. Specifically, we unbundle the panel interaction under rule and
standard conditions and provide a framework for understanding a court’s
relative deference to agency interpretations based on the diversity of the
judicial panel’s political-ideological makeup and the form of the legal doc-
trine. In addition, we test our framework using the two major legal doc-
trines from the last sixty years covering judicial review of agency
interpretations—Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944), and Chev-
ron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resource Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837
(1984)—the former representing a standard, the latter a rule.
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I. INTRODUCTION
DOES the form of legal doctrine—rule versus standard—impactthe federal appellate courts’ fidelity to the law? Is a political mi-nority judge on a panel of three judges more empowered by a
rule or a standard? Does such empowerment lead to more doctrinally
consistent decisions? More moderate decisions? Do Democrat and Re-
publican appointed minority panel judges behave differently? In this arti-
cle, we consider whether “panel effects”—that is, the condition where the
presence, or expected voting behavior, of one judge on a judicial panel
influences the way another judge, or set of judges, on the same panel
votes—varies by the form of the legal doctrine in place. In particular, we
consider whether the hand of an ideological minority appellate judge
(that is, a Democrat appointee with two Republican appointees or a Re-
publican appointee with two Democrat appointees) is strengthened by a
doctrine packaged in the form of a rule rather than a standard.1
We consider these panel effects questions in the context of judicial re-
view of agency interpretations of statutes—a fundamental issue in admin-
istrative law scholarship. The question of how (and how should) courts
review agencies’ interpretations of statutes has been extensively studied
from traditional legal, positive political theory as well as empirical per-
spectives. In this article, traditional legal scholarship informs our under-
standing of the characteristics of various administrative law doctrines, in
both form and substance, which we then employ for our positive theory
of panel effects in administrative law—a theory we then examine
empirically.
1. This particular type of panel effects is an expanded version of the phenomenon
known as the “whistleblower” effect. See Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, Judicial
Partisanship and Obedience to Legal Doctrine: Whistleblowing on the Federal Courts of
Appeal, 107 YALE L.J. 2155 (1998).
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We consider here, in particular, whether judges on a three-judge appel-
late panel reviewing an agency’s interpretation of a statute interact differ-
ently with each other based on whether the guiding review doctrine
comes in the form of a rule or a standard. We unbundle the panel interac-
tion under rule and standards conditions and provide a framework for
understanding a court’s relative deference to agency interpretations
based on the diversity of the judicial panel’s political-ideological makeup
and the form of the legal doctrine (rule versus standard) in place.
In addition to a framework, we offer a preliminary empirical evaluation
of our theory using the two major doctrines covering judicial review of
agency interpretations—Skidmore v. Swift & Co.2 and Chevron U.S.A.
Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.3 Our study covers the
years 1974 through 1994. Skidmore represents a prototypical doctrinal
standard applied routinely by courts reviewing agencies’ interpretations
of statutes during the first ten years of our study. Chevron is a compara-
tively rule-like doctrine that dominated judicial review of agency legal
interpretations the latter ten years of our study. Comparing judicial panel
dynamics across the two periods helps to inform our understanding of the
differences in panel effects under rule and standard legal regimes.
II. PANEL EFFECTS LITERATURE
There are multiple theories of so called “panel effects”—the condition
of having judges on a three-judge panel where the presence, or expected
voting behavior, of one judge may affect the voting behavior of other
judges, and vice versa. The theories draw upon a number of disciplines
and approaches—including political science, psychology, and the eco-
nomics of information. With some variation, the common phenomenon
the theories attempt to explain is the ability of one judge, usually in the
political minority, to influence or change the expected vote of the other
two judges in the panel majority. In other words, why would a two-judge
panel majority (e.g., a panel majority made up of two Democrat appoin-
tees or two Republican appointees) behave any differently than a three-
judge panel majority (e.g., a panel made up of three Democrat appoin-
tees or three Republican appointees). In either case, the political majority
has the power to control the case outcome. The psychological explanation
rests on group cohesion theory where a unified group of judges (that is,
three judges with the same political-ideological make-up) is more likely
to make an ideologically extreme, unchecked decision than if the group
had more ideological balance (that is, an ideological minority member on
the panel).4 The information economics theory stresses the incentives of a
minority member to engage in costly efforts to find more factual informa-
tion on the case and its policy implications, and to share that information
2. 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
3. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
4. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DAVID SCHKADE, LISA M. ELLMAN & ANDRES SAWICKI, ARE
JUDGES POLITICAL? AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY (2006).
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with the other members of the panel, who will then moderate their more
extreme positions.5 One political science approach focuses on the ability
of a minority member, who is aligned with the circuit en banc or the Su-
preme Court, to act as the higher court’s agent and threaten exposure
through a possible dissent of any decision by a panel majority that runs
counter to the higher court’s ideological preferences.6 These theoretical
approaches are not necessarily inconsistent with each other and all could
be at work in any given case. The key to each approach is the diversity, or
lack of it, on the appellate panel.
For the most part, these various panel effects theories are neither de-
pendent in any manner on the presence of legal doctrine nor the form of
that doctrine (rules or standards). They rely, instead, on other political,
social, and informational factors. Perhaps overstated, but to the point,
Cox and Miles observe the following:
Studies of judicial decisionmaking typically link judicial ideology to
ultimate case outcomes without tracing the impact of ideology
through the analytical framework of the applicable legal doctrine.
For political scientists who adhere to the more extreme versions of
the attitudinal model, the inattention to law is unsurprising. They be-
lieve that the pursuit of judicial policy preferences fully explains judi-
cial behavior; legal variables are irrelevant. But for legal academics,
empirical evidence about the relationship between doctrinal struc-
ture and ideology should have paramount importance.7
The main exception to this criticism, at least with respect to studies of
judicial panel effects, is Whistleblowing Theory (“WT”), which identifies
legal doctrine as a central element affecting how judges engage each
other on ideologically mixed or unified judicial panels.8 WT posits that
ideological minority judges in mixed panels can threaten to expose “diso-
bedience” of legal doctrine by the majority (and the minority member is
incentivized to play this guardian role when the doctrine supports her
desired policy outcome) and thus prevent extreme, doctrinally unsupport-
able, outcomes by the panel majority. By contrast, when the panel lacks
political diversity (unified panel), the three like-minded judges are less
inclined to feel any doctrinal constraints in pursuit of their preferred pol-
icy outcomes, as the risk of negative exposure to higher courts, other
judges, the legal and academic community, and the public is lower than
when a panel member with an ideologically opposed position is present
5. Matthew Spitzer & Eric Talley, Left Right and Center: Strategic Information Ac-
quisition and Diversity in Judicial Panels (August 23, 2010) (unpublished manuscript) (on
file with authors).
6. See, e.g., Jonathan P. Kastellec, Panel Composition and Voting on the U.S. Courts
of Appeals over Time, 64 POL. RESEARCH Q. 377 (2011); Jonathan P. Kastellec, Hierarchi-
cal and Collegial Politics on the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 73 J. POL. 345, 345 (2011).
7. Adam B. Cox & Thomas J. Miles, Judicial Ideology and the Transformation of
Voting Rights Jurisprudence, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1493, 1494 (2008).
8. Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, Judicial Partisanship and Obedience to Legal
Doctrine: Whistleblowing on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 107 YALE L.J. 2155, 2158–59
(1998).
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and willing to dissent. The key determinants of the WT model, with re-
spect to moderation or compromise among the panelists, are the diversity
of the panel and the legal doctrine in place—that is, whether the sub-
stance of the legal doctrine favors the minority or majority members
when faithfully applied. The hierarchical principal–agent explanation of
panel effects (that is, high court disciplinary control over wayward
panels) can be thought of as one version of WT. In that approach, the
threat of a minority judge who can signal doctrinal disobedience to a
higher reviewing court moderates that panel majority. Yet another ver-
sion of WT could be based on deliberative conditions among the judges—
that is, a minority judge may be able to convince the other judges to fol-
low the applicable legal doctrine by argument and collegial forces (rather
than threat of higher court exposure). In either version of WT, panel di-
versity and the direction/substance of legal doctrine (to the extent that it
correlates with ideological preferences) work in combination to produce
an outcome.
In the context of administrative law, the judicial whistleblowing influ-
ence can be empirically observed in the behavior of three-judge circuit
panels reviewing agency statutory interpretation. In 1998, Cross and
Tiller examined 170 cases in which the D.C. Circuit reviewed agency in-
terpretations of regulatory statutes.9 They examined whether partisan-al-
igned panels (that is, three Republican or three Democrat appointees
sitting on the three-judge panel together) and partisan-mixed federal
court panels (two Democrat and one Republican appointees, or two Re-
publican and one Democrat appointees) were more likely to apply, in an
unbiased and consistent manner, the Chevron doctrine (a doctrine the
substance of which counsels strong deference towards agency interpreta-
tions of statutes) based on whether the agency’s policy matched the panel
majority’s ideological preferences (that is, ideologies aligned with the
partisanship of the judges’ appointing president). In other words, would
panels dominated by Republican (Democrat) appointees be more likely
to obey the Chevron doctrine’s push towards deference when the agency
likewise produced Republican-friendly (Democrat-friendly) regulatory
outcomes? Consistent with theory, they found that when the judges were
partisan-aligned, the panel’s willingness to apply Chevron deference was
high when the agency policy matched the assumed policy preferences of
the judicial panel and low when the agency policy did not match the as-
sumed policy preferences of the panel majority. They called this selective
application of legal doctrine based on partisan-ideological panel matchup
of doctrine to case outcome as doctrinal disobedience. With respect to
partisan-mixed panels, Cross and Tiller found, as expected, that there re-
mained a high level of Chevron deference when the agency’s policy out-
come was in line with that of the panel majority’s partisan preferences
(that is, the Chevron deference would produce the outcome preferred by
the two-judge partisan majority). However, when the partisan-mixed
9. See id. at 2168 (introducing this figure).
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panel’s preferences did not match the agency outcome (that is, Chevron
deference would not produce the outcome preferred by the panel major-
ity), there was more Chevron deference than when a three-judge partisan
aligned panel was in same position. Put differently, the presence of a mi-
nority panel member increased adherence to doctrinal precedent (Chev-
ron deference) when the doctrine was not politically favorable to the
panel partisan-majority. Cross and Tiller concluded that the partisan two-
judge majority would be sensitive to the minority panel member’s incen-
tive to act as a “whistleblower” should the partisan majority go against
doctrinal demands, and thus the majority was more inclined to follow the
legal doctrine in place—a victory for legal doctrine. The figure below il-
lustrates the result.




3 judge partisan-aligned and 
2-1 partisan mixed panels 
where Chevron deference 
supports the panel majority’s 
ideological position
2-1 judge partisan-mixed 
panel where Chevron does 




aligned panel where 
Chevron deference 
does not support 
panel’s ideological 
position
WT is not inconsistent with the other theories of panel effects. The
other theories occasionally suggest that the whistleblowing phenomenon
may be part of the moderation observed in their studies.11 Nonetheless,
WT poses some challenges to the other theories of panel effects in the
sense that WT suggests that there should be controls for (1) legal doc-
trine, and (2) whether the legal doctrine works in favor or against the
minority member in a given case context. Not controlling for these effects
may result in empirical panel effects studies that overstate, or understate,
the amount of moderation attributable to the group cohesion, informa-
tion costs, or political–hierarchical forces upon mixed panels. Indeed, if
the ability of a minority member to force the other members to compro-
mise (and thus moderate their decisionmaking) is driven in part by
whether the minority member has a strong doctrinal position (that is, the
honest/credible application of doctrine suggests the outcome preferred by
the minority member should obtain), then such a condition may act as a
trigger for moderation observed under the other theories.
10. Id. at 2173.
11. Id. at 2158.
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The doctrinally based whistleblowing approach has been further re-
fined by Cox and Miles who look at the effect of the form of doctrine
(rule or standard) on the interaction of judges on a panel.12 They consider
the Supreme Court’s sequential two-part doctrine (rules-plus-standard) in
Thornburg v. Gingles13 for evaluating claims brought under Section 2 of
the Voting Rights Act and use that structure to test relationships among
rules, standards, and ideological differences between judges. The first
stage of the Gingles doctrine is more rigidly rule-like and the second
stage involves a softer totality of the circumstances standard.14 Cox and
Miles found empirical evidence that ideological divisions in judicial vot-
ing patterns were more pronounced in the standard-like second stage of
Gingles than in the evaluation of the more rule-like factors in part one of
the test. From this they concluded that panel effects were dependent in
part on the form of legal doctrine: ideological extremism was more pro-
nounced in the second stage (standard) than in the first (rule) when the
panel was diverse (politically mixed).
While Cox and Miles offer a natural extension to WT, they do not ad-
vance it as such, perhaps because they attribute their effects strictly to the
form of the doctrine (rules, on their own, constrain more than standards)
rather than the empowerment of the minority member to reign in the
majority in the presence of a rule (whistleblowing effect). Moreover, their
study is somewhat compromised by the fact that they were studying the
two doctrinal forms in the context of one sequential two-part doctrine
(rule in first part, standard in second part) such that moving to the stan-
dard part of the doctrine was dependent on meeting the conditions in the
first, rule-like, part of the doctrine, thus creating endogeneity concerns.
In any event, along with the doctrinal focus of WT, Cox and Miles’ identi-
fication of doctrinal form as an essential feature of panel effects brings
one of the essential debates of law—rules versus standards—into sharp
focus and reintroduces important legal factors, nearly extinct in studies of
panel effects, back into their natural habitat of judicial decisionmaking.
III. PANEL EFFECTS AND DOCTRINAL FORM: THE ROLE OF
RULES VERSUS STANDARDS
The characteristics of rules and standards have been fully explored in
the legal literature.15 The key difference between rules and standards is
12. Adam B. Cox & Thomas J. Miles, Judging the Voting Rights Act, 108 COLUM. L.
REV. 1, 28 (2008).
13. 478 U.S. 30, 79 (1986).
14. The Gingles framework for determining if vote dilution had occurred under the
Voting Right Act included three rule-like preconditions for liability in part one: it required
plaintiffs to prove (1) that the minority group is sufficiently large and geographically com-
pact; (2) that the minority group is politically cohesive; and (3) that white voters vote as a
bloc and thereby typically defeat minority-preferred candidates. Part one was necessary
but not sufficient. If part one was met, then the court would need to engage in a multi-
factor balancing inquiry focusing on factors set out in a 1982 Senate report. See id. at 50.
15. See, e.g., LARRY ALEXANDER & EMILY SHERWIN, THE RULE OF RULES: MORAL-
ITY RULES AND THE DILEMMA OF LAWS (2001); FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE
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the relative discretion they afford to the decisionmaker. It is the form of
the doctrine that determines the extent of discretion available to a lower
court. The signature feature of a rule, in contrast to a standard, is the high
level of constraint it places on the decisionmaker.16 This practical distinc-
tion between rules and standards is evident, for example, in antitrust law.
In that field, courts have doctrinally defined certain actions as per se vio-
lations of the law and, thus, establish a rule-like principle of their illegal-
ity. Other actions, by contrast, are judged by the more standard-like “rule
of reason”—these actions may be illegal or not, depending upon the cir-
cumstances and how the court weighs them in an individual case.17
While a pure standard allows a court “to take into account all relevant
factors or the totality of circumstances,”18 many other formulations of
standards are possible. For example, a classic doctrinal standard in law is
the “balancing test” under which a court considers the equities between
the parties before deciding the outcome.19 Another common standard is
the multi-factorial test, under which a lower court considers a series of
factors as relevant to the decision’s outcome but has no particular direc-
tion as to how those factors are to be weighed. The Skidmore standard of
administrative law,20 discussed more below, relies on multiple factors and
is thus a good example of this type of multi-factorial standard.
In addition to its substantive formulation, the form of legal doctrine
can be thought of as a managerial choice for higher courts to consider in
controlling the discretion of lower courts as well as a tool for managing
disputes among judges on a panel. Indeed, the ex-ante choice between
rule and standard is often the essential feature of such managerial con-
trol.21 A high court overseeing a lower court comprised of many “unfaith-
ful” agents (that is, lower court judges with political ideologies or legal
preferences that differ from the higher court and who cannot be trusted
to advance the higher court’s preferences when there is ambiguity in law
and facts) may be better served with issuing a doctrine as a rule as op-
posed to a standard, thereby giving less discretion to the lower courts in
the substantive choices available to them, and increasing the ease with
which the higher court can monitor noncompliance. The power of the
RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND
IN LIFE (1991); Tonja Jacobi & Emerson H. Tiller, Legal Doctrine and Political Control, 23
J. L., ECON. & ORG. 326 (2007); Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 CAL. L. REV.
953 (1995); Louis Kaplow, Rules versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J.
557 (1992); Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV.
22 (1992); Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV.
L. REV. 1685 (1976).
16. SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES, at 231–32.
17. Mark A. Lemley & Christopher R. Lesle, Categorical Analysis in Antitrust Juris-
prudence, 93 IONA L. REV. 1207, 1213–15 (2008).
18. Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22,
59 (1992).
19. Id. at 60–61.
20. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
21. Frank B. Cross, Tonja Jacobi & Emerson H. Tiller, A Positive Political Theory of
Rules and Standards, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 1 (2012).
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higher court to monitor may be dependent in part on the presence of a
least one member on the lower court panel who may act as a
whistleblower if the majority disobeys the rule. The power of the minority
member would be greatly weakened if the doctrine were a standard, as
clear disobedience to the doctrine by the majority would be more difficult
for the minority member to claim relative to a doctrinal rule. By contrast,
a high court overseeing a lower court comprised mostly of faithful agents
(that is, lower court judges with political ideologies or legal preferences
that align with the high court and who can be trusted to advance the
higher court’s preferences when there is ambiguity in law and facts) may
be best served by a standard, thereby allowing lower court judges the
opportunity to fine tune the application of law to generate outcomes most
desired and shared by the lower court and higher court.
Within a panel of judges, the power of doctrinal form to manage dis-
putes plays out most clearly when the panel members are diverse. When
multi-member panels are nondiverse—that is, politically unified with
members who all share the same ideological or legal preferences—the
presence of a controlling doctrinal rule whose application would produce
an outcome at odds with the majority’s preferences could be easily over-
looked or discounted by the panel without fear that a fellow judge on the
panel with opposing preferences will invest in exposing the majority’s dis-
obedience of the rule (impacting reputation costs or creating reversal
risks for the majority members), or that the majority would need to un-
dertake considerable costs to tailor their opinion around a dissent (drain-
ing resources and weakening precedential value). When the panel is
diverse, the majority is more inclined to follow the dictates of a rule if
such is the doctrinal regime in place. This is not a problem when the rule
aligns with the majority’s outcome preferences because the panel major-
ity achieves its desired outcome. When the rule aligns with the minority
member’s preferences, the doctrine is in conflict with the majority’s out-
come preferences. While the panel majority may wish to ignore the doc-
trine, they cannot—the minority member will convince them to follow
doctrine, perhaps through the threat of dissent. Indeed, the minority
judge poses a threat to expose the majority’s contempt for the law and
reduces the likelihood that the majority would take such an action.
Figures 2 and 3 below illustrate the expected behavior of panel judges
under conditions of rules and standards, respectively.
454 SMU LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71
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Figure 3: Whistleblowing and Standards
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  The rules/standards distinction has implications for other theories of
panel effects. From the information economics approach, one could con-
jecture that a minority member would be more empowered by standards
than rules because standards would call for a broader range of informa-
tion from which a minority panel member could convince the majority—
basically more opportunity for persuasion through effort. This prediction
is opposite of the WT prediction which suggests that a standard would
work in favor of the panel majority who would see little restraint from the
doctrine. Group cohesion theory, on the other hand, would likely make
no prediction about the effects of doctrinal form—either force (informa-
tion management or whistleblowing) could be at work, or doctrine could
be irrelevant.
IV. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW DOCTRINES AND PANEL
EFFECTS
The set of doctrines governing judicial review of agency legal interpre-
tations offers an excellent opportunity to study panel effects theories and
the influence of the form of legal doctrine in an important, and often
politicized, area of judicial practice.
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A. RULES AND STANDARDS IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
Over the last half-century, the set of administrative law doctrines en-
dorsed by the Supreme Court has, to one degree or another, varied be-
tween a more standard-based approach and a more rule-based approach.
These doctrines, each emanating from the Supreme Court, have domi-
nated much of the administrative law literature. While legal academics
have debated at length the merits, requirements, and parameters of these
doctrines, they are well understood from a legal perspective for their
structural forms and implications for judicial review of agency behavior.
The doctrines have been routinely, if not consistently, applied by three-
judge panels of the circuit courts of appeals to thousands of cases involv-
ing dozens of federal administrative agencies and hundreds of statutes.
Although the courts apply several different doctrines to evaluate
agency interpretations of statutes,22 for most of the last half-century, two
doctrines have been particularly prominent. The first, chronologically at
least, is most readily associated with the 1944 case Skidmore v. Swift &
Co.23 The second, and more prominent, derives from the 1984 case Chev-
ron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.24 Both Skid-
more and Chevron represent “standards of judicial review,” articulating
the frame of mind that judges must assume in approaching agency inter-
pretations of statutory language rather than dictating substantive out-
comes.25 Nevertheless, while the Chevron doctrine possesses some
standard-like elements, it is substantially more rule-like than Skidmore,
which presents all the features of a classic standard.26 Closely associated
with these frames of rules and standards is the level of deference a court
should give an agency’s interpretation of a statute. The more standard-
like doctrine encourages less deference to the agency (“weak defer-
ence”), while the more rule-like doctrine encourages comparatively sub-
stantial deference to the agency’s interpretation (“strong deference”).
In Skidmore, the Supreme Court considered an interpretation of the
Fair Labor Standards Act advanced by the Administrator of the Depart-
ment of Labor’s Wage and Hour Division.27 Recognizing that the Admin-
istrator’s experience administering that statute gave him a certain
22. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Su-
preme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96
GEO. L.J. 1083, 1099–1100 (2008) (recognizing a deference continuum in Supreme Court
cases consisting of seven separate doctrines).
23. 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
24. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
25. See, e.g., Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 487 (1951) (describing
standards of review as reflecting moods); see also Nicholas R. Bednar & Kristin E. Hick-
man, Chevron’s Inevitability, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1392, 1444–46 (2017) (discussing the
nature of standards of review, including Chevron).
26. See Thomas W. Merrill, The Mead Doctrine: Rules and Standards, Meta-Rules and
Meta-Standards, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 807, 808 (2002) (describing Chevron as “more rule-
like” and Skidmore as “more standard-like”).
27. See Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 136.
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expertise regarding its interpretation, the Court described its approach
toward evaluating such administrative statutory interpretations:
[T]he rulings, interpretations, and opinions of [the agency], while not
controlling upon the courts by reason of their authority, do consti-
tute a body of experience and informed judgment to which courts
and litigants may properly resort for guidance. The weight of such a
judgment in a particular case will depend upon the thoroughness evi-
dent in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency
with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which
give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control.28
Consistent with the Supreme Court’s recognition that other factors be-
yond thoroughness, validity, and consistency might hold persuasive value,
courts employing the Skidmore standard have incorporated into the anal-
ysis several other considerations: the formality of the agency’s decision-
making process,29 the longevity of an agency’s interpretation,30 the
contemporaneity of an agency’s interpretation with the legislature’s adop-
tion of the statutory language,31 and the degree of agency expertise re-
quired in answering the interpretive question,32 among others. The Court
has not, however, offered guidance regarding how reviewing courts ought
to balance the various factors vis-a`-vis one another.33 Disparaged by Jus-
28. Id. at 140. Specifically, the Fair Labor Standards Act requires employers to pay
overtime when employees work more than forty hours per week. See 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1)
(1938). The statutory question in Skidmore was whether time that employees of the fire-
fighting department of a meat packing plant spent waiting for fire alarms to arise ought to
be taken into account in determining eligibility for overtime pay. See Skidmore, 323 U.S. at
135–36. The Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division of the Department of Labor
filed an amicus brief before the Supreme Court concluding that some but not all such time
was compensable. See id. at 139. In reaching his conclusion, the Administrator cited earlier
informal rulings issued by his office concerning analogous workplace scenarios. See id.
29. See, e.g., United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 228 & n.9 (2001) (citing Reno
v. Koray, 515 U.S. 50, 61 (1995) (recognizing formality as a Skidmore factor); Doe v. Leav-
itt, 552 F.3d 75, 81 (1st Cir. 2009) (“Greater weight ordinarily is due to interpretations that
result from a structured interpretive process as opposed to a catch-as-catch-can interpre-
tive process.”); Miller v. Herman, 600 F.3d 726, 734 (7th Cir. 2010) (weighing agency’s use
of formal procedures for nonbinding action in favor of deference).
30. See, e.g., Alaska Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation v. EPA, 540 U.S. 461, 487 (2004)
(“We ‘normally accord particular deference to an agency interpretation of “longstanding”
duration.’”); Estate of Landers v. Leavitt, 545 F.3d 98, 107 (2d Cir. 2008) (granting
agency’s “longstanding” interpretation “a great deal of persuasive weight”); Ammex, Inc.
v. United States, 367 F.3d 530, 535 (6th Cir. 2004) (deferring to agency interpretation left
“virtually unchanged for over three decades”).
31. See, e.g., Wong v. Doar, 571 F.3d 247, 262 (2d Cir. 2009) (“We give ‘substantial
weight’ to an agency’s construction of a statute that it is charged with enforcing, ‘particu-
larly when the construction is contemporaneous with the enactment of the statute.’”); Ca-
thedral Candle Co. v. U.S. Intern. Trade Comm’n, 400 F.3d 1352, 1367 (deferring to agency
interpretation in part because it “was contemporaneous with the enactment of the” rele-
vant statutory language); see also David R. Woodward & Ronald M. Levin, In Defense of
Deference: Judicial Review of Agency Action, 31 ADMIN. L. REV. 329, 333 (1979) (“Special
weight is given to a construction which the agency has followed since its governing statute
was adopted, especially if the agency participated in the drafting of the legislation.”).
32. See, e.g., Mead Corp., 533 U.S. at 228, n.10 (listing the agency’s “relative expert-
ness” as a Skidmore factor and citing Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Cent. Lincoln Peoples’ Util.
Dist., 467 U.S. 380, 390 (1984)).
33. See Mead Corp., 533 U.S. at 218.
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tice Scalia as “th’ol’ ‘totality of the circumstances’ test,”34 the Skidmore
standard calls upon reviewing courts to give agency statutory interpreta-
tions more or less “weight” based on the presence or absence of all of
these various factors.35 Skidmore does not, however, give an administra-
tive interpretation the power to “control” a court’s ultimate decision.36
Instead, where Skidmore applies, courts rather than agencies remain the
primary interpreters of statutory language. Hence, scholars often describe
Skidmore as prescribing “weak deference.”37
Note that Skidmore’s weak deference standard can only apply if the
reviewing court has determined that the statutory language is unclear and
susceptible to more than one interpretation. If the court panel believes
that the statute is clear on its face, then the court will go ahead with that
interpretation and give no deference to an alternative agency definition.
Therefore, Skidmore is really a two-step doctrine where the more “stan-
dard-like” application comes in Step Two, after the court has decided im-
plicitly, if not explicitly, that the statute in question is ambiguous.38
The Chevron doctrine, by comparison, is substantially less fluid and
more formalistic in its approach to judicial review. Like Skidmore, it has
two steps for ordering judicial review of agency legal interpretations, al-
though the second step takes a more rule-like formulation than Skidmore:
In Chevron, the court asks (1) whether the statute in question clearly and
unambiguously resolves the interpretive question; and if not, then (2)
whether the agency’s interpretation of the statute is a permissible one.39
In contrast to the weak deference of Skidmore, Chevron represents
“strong” or “controlling,” more rule-like deference.40 If a reviewing court
decides that a statute is susceptible of more than one permissible inter-
pretation, then so long as the agency’s choice falls within that range of
options, the court must defer even if the judges would prefer a different
alternative. According to one study of the federal courts of appeals that
broke down Chevron outcomes between the two steps, once judges deter-
mined the statutes to be ambiguous, they deferred to the agency’s inter-
pretation in 89% of cases—evidence of the rule-like deference that
34. Id. at 241 (Scalia, J. dissenting).
35. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
36. Id.
37. Richard W. Murphy, Judicial Deference, Agency Commitment, and Force of Law,
66 OHIO ST. L.J. 1013, 1037 (2005); William Funk, Legislating for Nonlegislative Rules, 56
ADMIN. L. REV. 1023, 1042 (2004); Jim Rossi, Respecting Deference: Conceptualizing Skid-
more Within the Architecture of Chevron, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1105, 1117 (2001).
38. See Kristin E. Hickman & Matthew D. Krueger, In Search of the Modern Skid-
more Standard, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1235, 1280 (2007) (finding an implicit “Step One” in
federal circuit court applications of the Skidmore standard).
39. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843–44 (1984).
40. See, e.g., William Funk, A Primer on Nonlegislative Rules, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 1321,
1341–43 (2001) (describing Chevron’s “strong deference” as in contrast to Skidmore’s
“weak deference”) (internal quotations omitted); Jim Rossi, Respecting Deference: Con-
ceptualizing Skidmore Within the Architecture of Chevron, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1105,
1110, 1117 (2001) (describing same).
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Chevron commands.41
The seeming rigidity of Chevron’s two steps disguises the potential mal-
leability of the doctrine.42 Legal scholars have argued for years over the
precise inquiry required by each step.43 Some judges are quite prepared
to find ambiguity at Chevron Step One in all but the most straightforward
statutes,44 while other judges are more inclined toward a robust inquiry
into congressional intent using all available tools of statutory construc-
tion.45 In some instances, the Supreme Court has seemed to cast Chevron
Step One as a purely textualist inquiry.46 In other cases, the Court has
relied heavily on legislative history in the course of Step One analysis.47
The circuit courts of appeals are divided over whether legislative history
may be considered at all in evaluating statutory clarity at Chevron Step
One.48 Courts and scholars similarly disagree over whether the inquiry at
Chevron Step Two ought to be limited to the substantive permissibility of
the agency’s interpretation49 or extended to include the thoroughness of
the agency’s deliberative process.50
41. Orin S. Kerr, Shedding Light on Chevron: An Empirical Study of the Chevron
Doctrine in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 15 YALE J. REG. 1, 31 (1998).
42. See Nicholas R. Bednar & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Inevitability, 85 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1392, 1418–42 (describing different variations of Chevron represented in
the jurisprudence); Thomas W. Merrill, The Mead Doctrine: Rules and Standards, Meta-
Rules and Meta-Standards, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 807, 810 (2002) (labeling Chevron’s “rule-
like appearance” as “deceptive”).
43. See, e.g., Gary Lawson, Outcome, Procedure and Process: Agency Duties of Expla-
nation for Legal Conclusions, 48 RUTGERS L. REV. 313 (1996); Ronald M. Levin, The
Anatomy of Chevron: Step Two Reconsidered, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1253 (1997); Thomas
W. Merrill, Textualism and the Future of the Chevron Doctrine, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 351
(1994); Cass Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2071
(1990).
44. See, e.g., Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 568 F.3d 675,
680 (8th Cir. 2009) (“[W]hen the context is a provision of the Internal Revenue Code, a
Treasury Regulation construing the words is nearly always appropriate.”).
45. See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of
Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 520–21 (suggesting that the meaning of a statute is more rather
than less often “apparent from its text and from its relationship with other laws,” but re-
jecting that “absolute equipoise” is necessary for deference).
46. See, e.g., Dept. of HUD v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125, 132 (2002) (“[R]eference to legis-
lative history is inappropriate when the text of the statute is unambiguous.”); National
R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Boston & Maine Corp., 503 U.S. 407, 417 (1992) (“If the text is
ambiguous and so open to interpretation in some respects, a degree of deference is granted
to the agency . . . .”); see also Thomas W. Merrill, Textualism and the Future of the Chevron
Doctrine, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 351, 358 (reading the Supreme Court’s Chevron jurisprudence
as shifting to a purely textualist Step One).
47. See, e.g., FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 130–155
(2000).
48. See Intermountain Ins. Serv. of Vail, LLC v. Comm’r, 134 T.C. 211, 234–36 (2010)
(Halpern & Holmes, J.J. concurring) (summarizing circuit positions regarding the issue).
49. See, e.g., Gary Lawson, Outcome, Procedure and Process: Agency Duties of Expla-
nation for Legal Conclusions, 48 RUTGERS L. REV. 313 (1996). Notably, in the only two
cases in which the Supreme Court has rejected agency action at Chevron Step Two, the
Court has restricted its analysis to the substantive validity of the agency’s interpretation
vis-a`-vis statutory text, history, and purpose. See Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715
(2006); AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Util. Bd., 537 U.S. 807 (2002).
50. See, e.g., Mark Seidenfeld, A Syncopated Chevron: Emphasizing Reasoned Deci-
sionmaking in Reviewing Agency Interpretations of Statutes, 73 TEX. L. REV. 83 (1994). The
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Notwithstanding these disagreements, Chevron’s two steps and its man-
date that courts defer to permissible agency interpretations of ambiguous
statutes is at least more outcome determinative and mechanical in appli-
cation than Skidmore’s fuzzier multi-factor approach. The mandatory na-
ture of Chevron Step Two in many cases may influence courts to narrow
the scope of their inquiry at Chevron Step One,51 although courts in other
cases may push the envelope of statutory clarity at Chevron Step One in
order to avoid deferring at Chevron Step Two.52 Furthermore, as Thomas
Merrill has observed, Chevron “narrows significantly the range of factors
that courts may consult” in evaluating agency legal interpretations.53
Until 1984 and the Court’s decision in Chevron, courts generally em-
ployed the multifactor standard now most closely associated with Skid-
more in reviewing most agency legal interpretations.54 The Supreme
Court counseled a stronger, more controlling deference where Congress
specifically granted agencies the authority to adopt binding rules and reg-
ulations elaborating a particular statutory requirement55 or in cases impli-
cating an agency’s interpretation of its own regulations.56 Nevertheless,
most agency actions occurred under conditions warranting only the lesser
Skidmore standard-like review.57
The Court’s Chevron decision in 1984 expanded the scope of the con-
trolling deference mandate to a substantially broader collection of agency
actions.58 Although the courts’ application of Skidmore factors never en-
tirely died away,59 the Chevron doctrine gained such prominence that
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has been particularly
vocal in its sometime embrace of process considerations, also known as “hard look re-
view,” within Chevron Step Two, see, e.g., Covad Commc’ns v. FCC, 450 F.3d 528, 537
(D.C. Cir. 2006), and the Supreme Court has signaled its receptivity to combining the two
inquiries. See, e.g., Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 136 S. Ct. 2117, 2125–26 (2016);
Judulang v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 476, 483 n.7 (2011).
51. See, e.g., Yellow Transp., Inc. v. Michigan, 537 U.S. 36, 45–46 (2002) (framing
Chevron Step One very narrowly in deferring to agency interpretation as permissible).
52. See, e.g., Food & Drug Admin. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S.
120, 131–61 (2000) (framing Chevron Step One broadly and engaging in extensive analysis
at that step to avoid deferring to novel FDA interpretation); see also Bednar & Hickman,
supra note 42, at 1419–23 (describing how the Chevron decision itself can be read to sup-
port alternative approaches to Chevron Step One).
53. Thomas W. Merrill, The Mead Doctrine: Rules and Standards, Meta-Rules and
Meta-Standards, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 807, 810 (2002).
54. See 1 KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE (2d ed. 1978).
55. See, e.g., Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 453 U.S. 34, 44 (1981); Batterton v. Francis,
432 U.S. 416, 425–26 (1977); Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Scarlett, 300 U.S. 471,
474 (1937); AT&T Corp. v. United States, 299 U.S. 232, 236–37 (1936).
56. See, e.g., Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965); Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand
Co., 325 U.S. 410 (1945).
57. See Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416, 424–25 & n.9 (1977) (observing at that time
that agency interpretations “ordinarily” though not always received Skidmore-like defer-
ence); 1 KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE (2d ed. 1978).
58. See, e.g., KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE EIGHTIES: 1989
SUPPLEMENT TO ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 508, 525 (2d ed. 1989) (acknowledging
Chevron’s expansion of strong deference).
59. See, e.g., Bright v. Houston Nw. Med. Ctr. Survivor, Inc., 888 F.2d 1059, 1061 (5th
Cir. 1989), on reh’g, 934 F.2d 671 (5th Cir. 1991); Elizabeth Blackwell Health Ctr. for
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some questioned Skidmore’s continuing vitality as a standard of review.60
In 2000, in Christensen v. Harris County, the Court reinvigorated Skid-
more as a competing standard to Chevron.61 In 2001, in United States v.
Mead Corp.,62 the Court articulated a new test for discerning case by case
whether Chevron or Skidmore provides the appropriate review doctrine
for agency legal interpretations. As a result of these cases, both Chevron
and Skidmore now enjoy a robust jurisprudence in the courts of appeals,
although most cases continue to fall within Chevron’s coverage.
Table 1 below summarizes the two main doctrines at their Step Two
forms. Both share the Step One condition (ambiguity) and, at least in
their formulation, cannot be differentiated readily at that stage.
Table 1: Skidmore Standard and Chevron Rule Summarized
Skidmore Standard (multifactor test)63 Chevron Rule64
“The weight [given to an agency’s inter- “[T]he court does not simply impose its
pretation] . . . in a particular case will own construction on the statute, as
depend upon the thoroughness evident in would be necessary in the absence of an
its consideration, the validity of its rea- administrative interpretation. Rather . . .
soning, its consistency with earlier and the question for the court is whether the
later pronouncements, and all those fac- agency’s answer is based on a permissi-
tors which give it power to persuade, if ble construction of the statute.”
lacking power to control.”
“The court need not conclude that the
Added factors: the formality of the agency construction was the only one it
agency’s decisionmaking process, the permissibly could have adopted to
longevity of an agency’s interpretation, uphold the construction, or even the
the contemporaneity of an agency’s reading the court would have reached if
interpretation with the legislature’s the question initially had arisen in a
adoption of the statutory language, and judicial proceeding.”
the degree of agency expertise required
in answering the interpretive question.
B. THE AMBIGUITY–DEFERENCE MODEL
 We now bring the features of the rule–standard continuum of judicial
review of agency interpretation of statutes to the analysis of panel effects.
To do this, we consider the dynamics within a judicial panel faced with
Women v. Knoll, 61 F.3d 170, 191 (3d Cir. 1995); Reich v. Newspapers of New England,
Inc., 44 F.3d 1060, 1072 (1st Cir. 1995).
60. See, e.g., Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 589–90 (2000) (Scalia, J. con-
curring) (objecting to Court’s reliance on Skidmore on ground that Chevron replaces Skid-
more review); Arab Amer. Oil Co., 499 U.S. at 260 (1991) (Scalia, J. concurring)(same); see
also Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989
DUKE L.J. 511 (Justice Scalia elaborating on his view of Chevron).
61. Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000).
62. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 234–35 (2001).
63. Skidmore v. Swift & Co. 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) (emphasis added).
64. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984) (em-
phasis added).
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review of an agency’s interpretation of a statute. The key questions for
the panel are (1) is the statute ambiguous, and (2) should the court defer
to the agency’s interpretation (based on the exogenous rule or standard
in place at the time). The “ambiguity–deference” questions are endoge-
nous and need to be further unbundled. We begin with a few key assump-
tions and characterizations of the panel dynamics. They are summarized
as follows:
• Most regulatory statutes interpreted by agencies and challenged in
the courts are subject to claims (and judicial arguments) of
“ambiguity.”
• Ambiguity (dispute over meaning or lack of meaning) for the panel
decreases when judges are ideologically similar (3-0 political line-
up); ambiguity increases when judicial panels are diverse (2-1 politi-
cal line up).
• Dissenting views about ambiguity of statute is a management prob-
lem within the panel—that is, the panel majority does not want a
dissent on the ambiguity issue.
• Default doctrinal mechanism (set up in advance by the Supreme
Court and embedded in the doctrinal precedent) helps to solve am-
biguity–dissent problem:65 When there is split panel (ambiguity in
statute):
○Skidmore standard: panel majority decides meaning in Step Two;
○Chevron rule: status quo (agency interpretation) decides meaning
in Step Two.
The first assumption, that most challenged statutory interpretations by
agencies are subject to the claim (and judge argument) that the statute is
ambiguous, is easily supported. That most words are generally subject to
multiple meanings reveals itself in various areas of law requiring the in-
terpretation of legal texts, such as contract law and administrative law. In
contract law, for example, courts routinely wrestle with the decision of
whether to allow extrinsic evidence (evidence outside the written words
of a contract) to prove that a term in a contract, seemingly plain on its
face, is actually ambiguous and subject to the varied meaning that each of
the parties advance.66 The often-cited concern is that once extrinsic evi-
dence is allowed to be admitted for consideration, almost any word in a
contract can appear ambiguous. In administrative law, and statutory in-
terpretation cases more generally, a fairly elaborate set of “tools of statu-
tory interpretation”—including legislative history, statutory purpose, and
canons of statutory construction—have developed to aid judges in dis-
65. To be sure, the doctrinal regime in place is not exogenous to the broader decision-
making structure within a judicial hierarchy. As described earlier, the Supreme Court
likely has set out its choice of governing rules and standards in advance in anticipation of
how panels will engage over large numbers of cases. Nonetheless, the doctrinal choice gen-
erally is not in play for any given panel decision—it is static. Of course, this does not mean
the panel will obey it.
66. See, e.g., 11 RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 33.42 AMBIGUITY AS
A PREREQUISITE (4th ed. 2017).
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cerning meaning from statutory text. But, as with the use of extrinsic evi-
dence for contract interpretation, these tools of statutory interpretation
also may be used to create ambiguity out of what otherwise appears to be
plain meaning.67
Relatedly, and our second assumption, the likelihood that the panel
will consider the statute to be ambiguous increases with the diversity of
membership on the panel. Contextual understanding of words increases
with diversity of experiences among individuals. The more similar the
panel (that is, for our model when the panel members all share the same
political–ideological background—three Democrat or three Republican
appointees together on a panel), the less disagreement the members will
have over the meaning of the statutory text. The more diverse the panel
(two Democrats and one Republican, or two Republicans and one Demo-
crat), the more likely that one judge will find the meaning of a statutory
term or phrase to be different than another judge on the panel. Add to
this that there are ideological incentives for the minority member on the
panel to threaten to dissent about the ambiguity dimension (Step One in
both Skidmore and Chevron), thus challenging the panel majority’s desire
to set a particular meaning for the statute in the first step with a conclu-
sion that the statute’s meaning is plain. Put differently, the credibility of
the panel majority’s conclusion in Step One that the statute has a definite
singular meaning and is not ambiguous is put at risk when there is one
judge of the three who disagrees about that conclusion (as almost by defi-
nition a statutory term is ambiguous when even judges cannot agree
about the meaning). Consequently, a minority-minded judge has signifi-
cant power to push the question to Step Two, especially if Step Two anal-
ysis would increase the chances of a case outcome preferred by that
judge.
For a panel of like-minded judges (as with those sharing the same parti-
san leanings), the ambiguity question of Skidmore/Chevron Step One is
typically not a problem, as they share contextual understandings and
preference goals. For partisan-split panels, the problem is acute. As statu-
tory language (and the agency’s interpretation, or the panel majority’s
interpretation, of that language) can easily be challenged, and as minority
judges have incentives to challenge such language, a management di-
lemma for the panel is posed. Voting unity among the panel members
strengthens precedent value because other judges in future cases, or upon
review of the present case, will view the decision as less assailable than
one where there is a fracture among the judges represented by a dissent.
Dissent, especially if followed by a higher court reversal, threatens the
reputation of the other judges and perhaps their promotion prospects.
Moreover, judges prefer collegiality (in the form of panel voting unanim-
ity) over dissents as it avoids tit-for-tat decisionmaking and poor relations
67. See generally, e.g., FRANK B. CROSS, DECISION MAKING IN THE U.S. CIRCUIT
COURTS OF APPEALS (2007).
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among colleagues.68
Given the ambiguity–deference problem of Step One, Skidmore and
Chevron present two different Step Two mechanisms to solve the mana-
gerial dilemma within the panel when the panel is ideologically diverse.
Skidmore uses a standard (multi-factorial test), which essentially allows
the majority to control the statutory meaning in Step Two (either by de-
ferring to the agency or not, considering the list of unweighted factors).
By contrast, Chevron creates a strong rule-like presumption that the
court defers to the agency interpretation (based on whether the agency’s
interpretation was “permissible”—that is, a plausible, even if not the best,
reading of the statute). Chevron empowers the minority member with the
ability to more easily force the majority to accept the agency’s interpreta-
tion (in Step One, forcing a finding of ambiguity, and in Step Two forcing
“obedience” to the Chevron rule’s presumption of deference).
Note that the form of doctrine is most important for diverse panels
(ideologically “split-panels”). The managerial dilemma is not a problem
(or is much less of a problem) when the panel is ideologically unified—
they more likely share a common understanding of statutory meaning
and policy preferences generally, thereby greatly reducing threat of
dissent.
Table 2 below maps out the expected outcomes of cases under the
Skidmore (standard) and Chevron (rule) doctrines.
Table 2: Panel Outcomes Under Rule and Standard
Panel Political Majority/Agency Deference Under Deference Under











As illustrated by the table, partisan-unified panels under either doctri-
nal form (Skidmore standard or Chevron rule) essentially behave the
same in terms of deference to agency interpretations. When deference
serves the policy preferences of the panel as a whole, they defer (either
through Step One or Step Two conclusions). These decisions go unchal-
lenged because they accord well with the doctrine in place and there are
no likely dissenters (as the panel lacks diversity and ideological conflict).
If deference does not serve the ideological purposes of the panel, they
defer much less to the agency. Under the Skidmore standard regime, this
is done through either Step One or Step Two conclusions (Step One:
“Statute is clear and the agency got it wrong”; Step Two: “Statute is am-
68. See Lee Epstein, William M. Landes, & Richard A. Posner, Why (and When)
Judges Dissent: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 3 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 1 (2011).
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biguous; agency deserves no deference based on multi-factors; policy in-
valid.”). Under the Chevron rule, the nondeference must generally be
resolved at Step One (“Statute is clear; agency misinterpreted statute)
rather than Step Two (which counsels deference to any permissible read-
ing). Again, in a partisan-unified panel there is no likely dissenter to chal-
lenge any Step One conclusions regarding ambiguity of statute, so for
such a panel there is little distinction between Skidmore and Chevron
analysis as that panel dictates the meaning of the statute.
The dynamics change when the panel is an ideologically partisan-split
panel. If the policy of the agency matches with the panel majority, then
the panel will defer to the agency, although even more likely under Step
Two analysis than Step One. The potential for dissent with a Step One
conclusion (“statute is clear”) is more problematic than for Step Two,
where Skidmore has a flexible standard allowing for deference and Chev-
ron counsels deference in a rule-like manner. Step Two deference would
appear to stay within the doctrinal boundaries with ease. If the policy of
the agency does not match the panel majority, then we would expect to
see differences between the standard and rule regimes in terms of case
outcome. Under the Skidmore standard, we would not expect the court to
defer to the agency, instead finding in the multi-factor test of Step Two
that the agency’s decision is not entitled to deference. This is not a monu-
mental task given the variety of factors the panel may consider to reach
that conclusion. By contrast, under the Chevron rule the panel would
have a more difficult task to oppose deference. If the panel chose to over-
ride the agency in Step One (“statute is not ambiguous and it means what
we say it means, not what the agency says it means”), the minority panel
member could easily make a credible dissent based on ambiguity, thus
causing a problem for the panel majority’s credibility; if the panel admits
ambiguity in Step One and attempted Step Two nondeference, the minor-
ity would then stress that the strong deference presumption of the Chev-
ron rule is being ignored, thus raising the concern for the higher court
that doctrine may have been ignored. These risks push the panel majority
to accept the agency’s policy, more often than it would wish. This last
scenario is the whistleblowing effect and represents the differential im-
pact of the Skidmore and Chevron doctrines.
In sum, the main panel effects difference in having a standard versus a
rule as the guiding doctrinal regime occurs when the panel is diverse,
when agency policy does not match the panel majority’s policy prefer-
ences, and when the doctrinal rule works in favor of the minority mem-
ber’s preferences. In this situation the panel majority is less able to
pursue its policy preferences when a rule (Chevron) is in place than when
a standard (Skidmore) is in place. Another way to state it is that adher-
ence to doctrine is more likely to take place when (1) panels are diverse
and (2) rules, rather than standards, are in place.
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V. THE EMPIRICS
Having above laid out a basic theory of doctrinal form, panel effects,
and obedience to legal doctrine, we now explore the subject with a pre-
liminary empirical analysis of both the Skidmore and Chevron doctrines.
The broad empirical questions are whether doctrine matters in judicial
review of agency statutory interpretation (in particular, whether the form
of a doctrine matters as it is represented in a standard-like Skidmore form
or a more rule-like Chevron form) and under what political conditions on
the court (panel partisan composition) do these doctrines matter. Given
the limited tools available to collect and analyze the nuanced meaning of
legal doctrines, our analysis is exploratory and preliminary. Nonetheless,
we find results from our study that invite further theoretical and empiri-
cal analyses.
A. DESIGN
Our dataset consists of all federal court of appeals opinions published
ten years before and after the Chevron decision (between June 25, 1974
and June 25, 1994) that were included under the Westlaw headnote for
executive statutory construction (361k219).69,70 This resulted in a sample
consisting of 1,176 cases, 478 from the Skidmore (pre-Chevron) era and
698 from the Chevron era. We excluded a number of observations as inel-
igible because a federal agency was neither a party nor participant in the
case. Additionally, decisions from emergency appellate panels were re-
moved. We also determined that a number of cases were too complicated
to include on the basis that there was inter-agency conflict regarding au-
thority to interpret the statute. En banc panels were also excluded. Fi-
69. Due to the complexity of the questions before us and the unique nature of aspects
of the project, we undertook a pilot study to assess sample size for and the feasibility of a
larger project. First, we identified the population of cases in which a federal agency partici-
pated and that involved a challenge to the federal agency’s interpretation of a statute. To
do so, we used the Westlaw headnote for executive statutory construction (361k219) to find
candidate cases. Within the headnote, we specifically sampled federal appellate court cases
decided between December 4, 1944 and August 9, 2011. We took a stratified random sam-
ple of 400 observations divided equally among three eras: before Chevron (December 4,
1944 to June 24, 1984); after Chevron but before Mead (June 25, 1984 to June 17, 2001);
and after Mead (June 18, 2001 to August 9, 2011). Sampling weights were used in the
analyses to correct for any bias that this stratification could cause. After identifying eligible
observations in line with the study reported in this article, we were left with 251
observations.
By including the Mead era as a distinct era in our sampling scheme, we were able to
consider the robustness of our results in light of any potential confounding effect caused by
the decision. Ultimately, we concluded that the Mead era was predominantly an extension
of the Chevron period with few cases falling into the Mead-Skidmore type. Thus, we be-
lieve that our findings in this article are helpful in thinking about the influence of Chevron
even in the Mead era.
70. We took advantage of the Westlaw headnote to identify cases involving statutory
interpretation rather than relying on case citations due to issues regarding endogeneity:
panels could behave strategically as to citing Skidmore, Chevron, etc. See Cass R. Sunstein,
Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 191 (2006). Based on the feedback regarding the
pilot, we decided to narrow the range of years from which we sampled in order to reduce
the potential for omitted variable bias.
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nally, cases where the agency’s interpretation lacked an identifiable
ideological direction were dropped. Ultimately, we were left with 929 ob-
servations, 370 from the Skidmore period and 559 from the Chevron
period.71
For each observation, we included the basic identifying information for
the case: name, citation, decision date, and circuit. Our outcome variable
is binary and captures whether the panel ruled in favor of the agency’s
interpretation (deference). Qualitative textual analysis was used to code
this variable. We also collected the name of each panel judge member
from the decisions. Using the Biographical Directory of Federal Judges,72
we were able to identify the party of the appointing president for each
panel member. Based on this information, we were able to code the polit-
ical ideology of the panel majority and whether the panel was partisan-
unified (all Democrat or Republican appointees) or partisan-split (two
Republican and one Democrat appointees, or one Democrat and two Re-
publican appointees). The partisan composition of the observations broke
down with 368 panels with a Democrat appointed majority and 561
panels with a Republican appointed majority.
For challengers, we captured the challenging party type and the ideo-
logical direction of the challenging party. The ideological direction of the
agency’s position (conservative or liberal) was coded in terms of the chal-
lenging party: where a challenging party is liberal, the agency’s position is
coded as conservative (and vice versa). The variable for policy conver-
gence—that is, whether the agency’s policy and the panel majority’s pol-
icy preferences align—was created by comparing the party of the
appointing president for the panel majority to the ideological direction of
the agency’s position. The coding conventions used to determine the ide-
ological direction of the challenging party can be found in the Appendix.
Considering Whistleblower Theory in terms of rules and standards re-
quires a complex analysis among the role of policy convergence between
the agency and the court panel majority (“Convergence/Non-Conver-
gence”), the make-up of the panel (“Unified/Split Panel Partisanship”),
and the legal regime (“Skidmore Standard/Chevron Rule”) in which the
case occurs: in short, it requires a triple interaction. Estimating such an
interaction is quite data intensive. We also included controls for partisan
control of the circuit (and, thus, en banc panel) and whether a dissent
accompanied the opinion.
71. This left us with 820 cases. Due to the possibility of mixed outcomes on multiple
issues, some cases were coded as multiple observations.
72. Biographical Directory of Article III Federal Judges, 1789–present (2018), https://
www.fjc.gov/history/judges/search/advanced-search [https://perma.cc/WBQ3-SLYA].
2018] Panel Effects in Administrative Law 467
B. RESULTS
The results of the logistic regressions are as follows:
Table 3: Democratic Majority Panels
Table 3: Democratic Majority Panels
Coef. Std. Err. z Pr>|z|
Convergence 0.867 0.667 1.3 0.194
Chevron Era -0.849 0.833 -1.02 0.308
Split Panel  0.434 0.597 0.73 0.467
Convergence · Chevron Era  1.290 1.063 1.21 0.225
Convergence · Split Panel -0.545 0.756 -0.72 0.471
Chevron Era · Split Panel 0.257 0.900 0.29 0.775
Convergence · Split Panel · Chevron Era -0.294 1.200 -0.25 0.806
Republican Circuit 0.307 0.302 1.02 0.31
Dissent -0.392 0.315 -1.25 0.212
Intercept  0.034 0.539 0.06 0.95
Table 4: Republican Majority Panels
Table 4: Republican Majority Panels
Coef. Std. Err. z Pr>|z|
Convergence -0.213 0.767 -0.28 0.781
Chevron Era -0.343 0.565 -0.61 0.543
Split Panel -0.665 0.573 -1.16 0.246
Convergence · Chevron Era 0.183 0.859 0.21 0.831
Convergence · Split Panel 0.200 0.868 0.23 0.817
Chevron Era · Split Panel 0.075 0.647 0.12 0.908
Convergence · Split Panel · Chevron Era 0.142 0.994 0.14 0.887
Republican Circuit -0.012 0.275 -0.04 0.965
Dissent -0.358 0.277 -1.29 0.196
Intercept 1.393 0.546 2.55 0.011
In the context of logistic regressions with interactions, the coefficients
in the tables are of limited use. Thus, we provide various graphic repre-
sentations of the data based on predicted probabilities:73
73. We took advantage of simulation to calculate the predicted probabilities and sig-
nificance. The simulation code we use is similar to the approach used in Clarify and Zelig.
See, e.g., Kosuke Imai, Gary King & Olivia Lau, Toward a Common Framework for Statis-
tical Analysis and Development, 17 J. COMPUTATIONAL & GRAPHICAL STATISTICS 892–913
(2008); Gary King, Mike Tomz & Jason Wittenberg, Making the Most of Statistical Analy-
ses: Improving Interpretation and Presentation, AM. J. POL. SCI. 44:347–361 (2000); Bennet
A. Zelner, Using Simulation to Interpret Results from Logit, Probit, and Other Nonlinear
Models, 30 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 1335 (2009).
For each set of predicted probabilities, we held the control variables constant at their
mode: the probabilities are calculated assuming a panel in a Republican circuit in which no
dissent was filed.
468 SMU LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71




3 judge partisan-aligned 
and 2-1 partisan split 
panels where deference 
supports the panel 
majority’s ideological 
position
2-1 judge partisan-split 
panel where deference does 




aligned panel where 








3 judge partisan-aligned 
and 2-1 partisan split 
panels where deference 
supports the panel 
majority’s ideological 
position
2-1 judge partisan-split 
panel where deference does 




aligned panel where 








3 judge partisan-aligned 
and 2-1 partisan split 
panels where deference 
supports the panel 
majority’s ideological 
position
2-1 judge partisan-split 
panel where deference does 




aligned panel where 




2018] Panel Effects in Administrative Law 469




3 judge partisan-aligned 
and 2-1 partisan split 
panels where deference 
supports the panel 
majority’s ideological 
position
2-1 judge partisan-split 
panel where deference does 




aligned panel where 





The detailed nature of the theory dictates a statistical model including a
triple interaction and thus many different configurations upon which to
bring data to bear. Furthermore, this study indicates that the behavioral
patterns of the panels vary by the partisan orientation of the panel major-
ity, indicating that analysis of the panels must be split into two separate
regressions—one for each type of panel majority, Republican and Demo-
crat.74 Thus, in an ideal world without data availability and resource con-
straints we would bring quite a bit more varied data to bear on this
problem. Unfortunately, we face limitations in available data and data
collection, and our study is under-powered accordingly.75,76
We do consider the suggestive patterns in the data that we believe help
advance the conversation regarding panel effects and doctrinal form, and
we suggest future avenues of inquiry. First, the point estimates for the
rate of deference in instances where the agency position is ideologically
opposed to the panel majority are lower in the Chevron era than in the
pre-Chevron era in all instances. For example, in the Skidmore era, uni-
fied majority Democrat panels deferred 58% of the time, while in the
Chevron era this rate fell to 38%. As Figures 3–7 illustrate, this pattern
holds whether the panel is majority Democrat or Republican and split or
unified. This is the opposite of what we would anticipate given the fact
that Chevron is generally understood to require more deference. Selec-
tion bias likely influences the level of observed deference before and af-
ter Chevron: likely changes in the legal environment caused by the
74. We set the number of observations for the data collection based on the results of
the pilot study we conducted. The pilot indicated that there were not differences in the way
that Democrat majority and Republican majority panels behaved. This is not true of the
data we collected for the full study.
75. Unfortunately, there is no way of defining the population of published cases that
will ensure that we have sufficient observations to calculate the effect.
76. Based on cross-tabulations of the data, we also found that the patterns in appeals
arising from agency adjudication generally followed the patterns that we would anticipate
but that appeals from rule-making did not. Unfortunately, we have insufficient data to run
multivariate models on the data separating these types of appeals.
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Chevron opinion could change what cases are appealed by litigants, lower
court (where applicable) behavior, and agency behavior, in addition to
behavior at the court of appeals.77 Specifically, agencies, litigants, and
lower court judges very likely altered their behavior based on the Chev-
ron decision to reflect the new, more deferential environment.78 For ex-
ample, litigants seeking to overturn agency decisions would be less likely
to pursue appeals after Chevron than before because the likelihood of
success was diminished after the decision.79 Thus, the types of cases ap-
pealed before and after Chevron may vary in important ways that create
the appearance that less deference is occurring even where the courts are
more deferential. We do not, however, know of any obvious form of liti-
gant selection that would cause us to overstate the whistleblower effect.
Additionally, to the extent that reviewing courts rely on whistleblowers to
signal non-compliance after Chevron,80 it may be that unified, non-con-
vergent panels have learned that they can rule with relative impunity.
One of the most striking aspects of the results is the fact that Democrat
majority and Republican majority panels appear to behave in very differ-
ent ways. Figure 8 helps illustrate the differences. In panels where at least
two members were appointed by a Democratic president, the influence of
ideology generally follows the anticipated pattern. Where a panel is ideo-
logically aligned with an administrative action, the panel is more likely to
find in favor of the agency. This effect appears to be more pronounced in
the Chevron era. The same pattern does not hold for panels where two
members were appointed by a Republican president. In those instances,
ideological alignment overall seems to have little to no influence.
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One potential cause of differences among the types of panels is selec-
tion bias. Over 75% of the Republican panels in the data occurred in
Republican-dominated circuits. Thus, liberal litigants facing the prospect
77. Linda R. Cohen & Matthew L. Spitzer, Solving the Chevron Puzzle, 57 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 65 (1994); see also George Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of
Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1984).
78. Id. at 94–96.
79. Id.
80. Cross & Tiller, supra note 11.
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of appealing a case involving an administrative agency action in these cir-
cuits would know that they were likely to confront an unfriendly panel
and no promising avenue of appeal (en banc panel or Supreme Court).
Thus, they would be unlikely to appeal. Instead, liberal litigants would
only appeal unusual cases. Liberal litigants in Democrat dominated cir-
cuits, on the other hand, would be more likely to appeal because a deci-
sion at the court of appeals level is almost always the court of last
resort.81
The effect of the presence of a potential whistleblower before and after
Chevron, represented in Figure 9, also appears to vary based on the parti-
san make-up of the panel. For majority Democrat panels, the presence of
a whistleblower increased deference to agencies not aligned with the
panel majority in both eras. For example, in cases where the panel is sit-
ting in a Republican circuit and there is no dissent, the increase in the
Chevron era is 16% compared to 11% in the pre-Chevron era. The pres-
ence of a Democrat on a Republican panel, on the other hand, is associ-
ated with a 13% decrease in outcomes in favor of an ideologically
opposed administrative agency in both eras.
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The differences between Democratic and Republican panels could be
explained by a number of factors related to external and internal panel
effects. The patterns may lend themselves to a more ideological explana-
tion that is related to external panel effects. The asymmetric nature of the
patterns is in large part in keeping with some prior findings.82 Kastellec
found evidence that the presence of a potential whistleblower (counter-
judge) has an asymmetric effect across Democrat and Republican major-
ity panels.83 He attributes this effect to external panel effects due to the
81. See, e.g., Jonathan P. Kastellec, Hierarchical and Collegial Politics on the U.S.
Courts of Appeals, 73 J. POL. 345, 345 (2011).
82. Id.; Jonathan P. Kastellec, Panel Composition and Voting on the U.S. Courts of
Appeals over Time, 64 POL. RESEARCH Q. 377 (2011); see also Jason J. Czarnezki, An
Empirical Investigation of Judicial Decisionmaking, Statutory Interpretation, and the Chev-
ron Doctrine in Environment Law, 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 767 (2008) (finding that Republi-
can judges were more likely to defer to the EPA in cases decided between 2003–05).
83. Jonathan P. Kastellec, Hierarchical and Collegial Politics on the U.S. Courts of
Appeals, 73 J. POL. 345, 345 (2011).
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hierarchical nature of the federal judiciary.84 Specifically, he believes that
Republican control of the Supreme Court, with some influence from the
partisan make-up of the respective circuit courts, accounts for evidence of
a whistleblower effect for Republicans sitting with two Democrats. Kas-
tellec found evidence that ideological voting was a more recent phenome-
non and more pronounced among Democrat majority panels.85
These patterns, however, may also arise from differences in doctrinal
approaches. In both the Skidmore and Chevron eras, a chief concern of
the panel is the meaning of the statute. Statutory interpretation is an area
of great controversy as to the proper ways of interpreting and under-
standing meaning. One explanation of outcomes in administrative cases is
that modes of statutory interpretation, rather than ideology, account for
differences.86 Kerr refers to at least one strain of this approach as the
interpretative model:
The interpretive model predicts that deference in individual cases de-
pends upon a judge’s approach to statutory interpretation—in partic-
ular, the likelihood that text will be considered ambiguous at
Chevron’s Step One. In contrast to the contextual and political mod-
els, the interpretive model accepts that judges will attempt to apply
the two-step test objectively. Nonetheless, the doctrine is considered
inherently unstable because individual judges will defer more or less
often depending upon how readily they perceive ambiguity in statu-
tory text.87
Scholars have disagreed as to the relationship between interpretation
modes and deference: some assert that textualists will defer less, while
others believe textualists will defer more.88 Additionally, it is unclear how
these approaches map onto panel effects: existing studies provide mixed
results at best that partisanship correlates with interpretative approaches
and that interpretative approaches map neatly onto outcomes.89 In order
to consider the possibility that doctrinal differences are driving the re-
sults, we would need to analyze the interpretative approach set forth in
the opinions. This is a possible avenue for further research.
Additionally, the results as to Republican majority panels are perplex-
ing. They imply that the introduction of a Democrat to a Republican ma-
jority panel would decrease the chances that the panel would uphold an
agency’s liberal action. We are aware of no theory of internal or external
panel effects that would explain this effect. Of course, these, along with
84. Kastellec also finds evidence of internal effects.
85. Jonathan P. Kastellec, Panel Composition and Voting on the U.S. Courts of Ap-
peals over Time, 64 POL. RESEARCH Q. 377 (2011).
86. Orin S. Kerr, Shedding Light on Chevron: An Empirical Study of the Chevron
Doctrine in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 15 YALE J. REG. 1, 3 (1998).
87. Id. at 4 (citations omitted).
88. Id. at 13–17.
89. See, e.g., FRANK B. CROSS, DECISION MAKING IN THE U.S. CIRCUIT COURTS OF
APPEALS (2007); David S. Law & David Zaring, Law Versus Ideology: The Supreme Court
and the Use of Legislative History, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1653 (2009).
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the other estimates, are merely suggestive and are not statistically signifi-
cant results. Additional data could easily obliterate such differences.
Another potential issue is that judges may have always been ideologi-
cal, but the extent to which partisanship is correlated with such positions
has changed. In other words, it may be that our ways of coding liberal and
conservative issues is primarily defined by current understandings of
those terms. Thus, measures built on these understandings may be in
some ways time-bound.90 Kastellec implicitly discusses this possibility in
terms of polarization, but it is not limited to polarization.91 This is an-
other possible avenue for future research in this area.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
This article makes important theoretical contributions and highlights
areas for further inquiry. Building on several literatures and important
pieces, we consider how the effect of panel diversity is influenced by the
legal context in terms of the form of the legal doctrine considered. This
inquiry avoids the artificial dichotomies present in many studies and seri-
ously considers the influence of both political conditions and legal doc-
trine. Furthermore, this article provides a detailed application of this
theory in the context of agency statutory interpretation, which has serious
implications for our understanding of administrative law and the separa-
tion of powers. Unlike prior work regarding this question, we are able to
consider the influence of doctrinal form over many cases rather than in-
terdependent decisions within the same case. Our work suggests that the
influence of the form of legal doctrine is conditional of the ideological
alignment of the panel majority.
We should, of course, note that our results are not significantly signifi-
cant. To the extent that we look at the basic patterns in the data, we find
indication that patterns of deference and whistleblower vary based on the
partisan affiliation of the panel majority. While some patterns conform to
our expectations, others do not. We believe that our failure to find any
significant differences flows from issues related to available data. Addi-
tionally, as we discuss in this article, though often ignored in empirical
work, the threat of bias due to selection effects is omnipresent in studies
of cases and should be taken seriously. We offer a frank discussion of the
types of selection bias we anticipate may exist and their potential to dis-
tort the empirical picture the results offer.
Ultimately, this is an area where further inquiry is warranted. Although
there are robust and sophisticated bodies of work regarding panel effects
and legal doctrine, these conversations are far from over. The distribution
of cases that we observe indicates that panel effects are shaped by the
intricacies of the legal context in ways that have not been fully explored.
90. See William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, Rational Judicial Behavior: A Sta-
tistical Study, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 775 (2009).
91. Jonathan P. Kastellec, Panel Composition and Voting on the U.S. Courts of Ap-
peals over Time, 64 POL. RESEARCH Q. 377 (2011).
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Continuing work in this area should focus on untangling these
complexities.
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APPENDIX: CHALLENGING PARTY POSITION
Liberal (typical)
• Employees Union challenging agency (such as, NLRB, DOL,
FLRA) or Employer—issues typically relating to safety, pay, union
rights, etc.
• Employee seeking workers compensation
• Employee challenging NLRB
• Employee challenging employer (may involve interpretation of
EEOC regulation, safety regulation, or other agency regulation)
• Environmental group challenging EPA for lax standard
• Consumer group challenging CPSC for weak product safety standard
• Consumer or debtor challenging business practice as unfair
• Person seeking social security, welfare rights, etc.
• Person seeking asylum or immigration rights (challenge to INS/BIA
decision)
• Minority employees challenging agency hiring/promotion practices
• Civil rights challenges (where interpretation of agency regulation
involved)
• Prisoner challenging Bureau of Prisons
• Veteran challenging Board of Veteran Appeals denial of benefits
• Tribe asserting sovereignty
• Democrats\liberals challenging elections
Conservative (typical)
• Business/Employer challenge to agency decision favoring employees,
consumers, environmental protection, anti-regulation, etc. (but not
challenge to agency decision that just favors another/competing busi-
ness or industry). Typical agencies challenged include EPA, NLRB,
DOL, CPSC, FDA, EEOC, OSHA, OSHC.
• Trade Association challenge to agency
• Hospital challenging HHS on Medicare reimbursement denials
• Chamber of Commerce challenging agency rule (too strict safety
standard, etc.)
• Bank challenging banking regulation
• Taxpayer challenging taxation
• State or local entity making a federalism claim
• Private School avoiding application of civil rights legislation
• Land owner or state or local entity opposing EPA
• Land Owner asserting property right
• Republicans\conservatives challenging elections
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No ideological position (typical)
• Business challenge to agency (such as FCC, FERC, or ICC) where
competitor business or industry benefits from regulation
• Heirs claiming entitlement to benefits
• Union opposing member’s claim
• State or local entity seeking compensation from federal government
